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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATE BUT EQUAL: JELDNESS v. 
PEARCE-AN ANALYSIS OF TITLE IX WITHIN THE CONFINES OF 
CORRECI'IONAL FACILITIES 
INTRODUCI'ION 
Although society generally has attempted to eradicate the sep­
aration of persons on the basis of an immutable characteristic, l the 
segregation of prisoners on the basis of sex has withstood this socie­
tal evolution. Sexually segregated prisons are, in fact, the "norm" 
throughout the United States.2 
Not surprisingly, the brunt of this segregation has fallen upon 
female prisoners as the minority group within the prison popula­
tion. Similar to the status of blacks both prior and subsequent to 
Plessy v. Ferguson,3 women prisoners often are provided with infer­
ior programs, facilities, and conditions of confinement as compared 
to those afforded their male counterparts.4 Though generally ac­
cepting of this separation, women prisoners have consistently ar­
gued for "separate but equal" treatment under the purview of the 
Equal Protection Clause.s The results of these claims, however, 
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (emphasizing that separat­
ing students "solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to 
be undone"). 
2. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 326 (1977); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 
1220, 1228 (9th Cir. 1994); Ralph R. Arditi et aI., Note, The Sexual Segregation ofAmer­
ican Prisons, 82 YALE L.J. 1229, 1246, 1250-51 (1973). 
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
4. See generally Arditi, supra note 2, at 1231-54; Rosemary Herbert, Note, Wo­
men's Prisons; An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94 YALE L.J. 1182, 1182-85, 1193-95 
(1985). 
5. See Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1265-78 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (alleging dis­
parities between male and female inmates in fifteen areas ranging from security classifi­
cations to visitation rights), affd, 69 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 1995); West v. Virginia Dep't of 
Corrections, 847 F. Supp. 402, 404 (W.D. Va. 1994) (challenging ability of state to re­
strict participation in Boot Camp Incarceration Program to male prisoners); Batton v. 
North Carolina, 501 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (alleging disparities between 
male and female prisoners in work release, vocational training, recreational opportuni­
ties, wages, and access to medical care and law library); Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F. Supp. 
1162, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1980) (challenging disparity between conditions of "c" custody 
status at the men's and women's prison); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1077 
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (alleging inequalities in educational and vocational programming, 
adequacy of facilities, prison industry and wage rates, and work pass programs); 
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have been strikingly different in light of nearly identical factual 
allegations.6 
Recently, aggrieved female inmates have turned to Title 1)(7­
which prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded educational 
programs and activities-in addition to the Equal Protection Clause 
to rekindle their fight for equality.8 In light of these new statutory 
challenges, courts will more frequently face the difficult task of rec­
onciling entrenched and widely accepted penological practices with 
full effectuation of the congressional command to eliminate sex dis­
crimination. This very dilemma was recently addressed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in leldness v. 
Pearce.9 In that decision, the court of appeals concluded that Title 
IX is violated if there is a lack of equality of opportunity in prison 
educational programs.10 
This Note will attempt to decipher the role Congress intended 
Title IX to play within the context of the prison environment, as 
well as the level of compliance to which prisons will be held in or­
der to achieve consistency with this role. Specifically, this Note will 
seek to determine exactly how much "equality" Title IX affords fe-
Barefield v. Leach, No. 10282 slip op. (D.N.M. Dec. 18, 1974) (alleging constitutional 
violations in educational programming, conditions of confinement, and the administra­
tion of prison regulations). 
6. Compare Pargo, 894 F. Supp. at 1261 (holding that female inmates at the Iowa 
Correctional Institute for Women were not similarly situated to various categories of 
male inmates at selected institutions within Iowa, thereby denying plaintiffs relief under 
the Equal Protection Clause) with Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1078, 1101 (holding that male 
and female prisoners were similarly situated, that differences in treatment were gender­
related, and that declaratory and injunctive relief for the state's failure to provide sub­
stantially equivalent treatment to its female prison population was appropriate). 
The one uniformity among courts in analyzing equal protection based claims 
brought by female prisoners has been the application of a rather ambiguous "parity of 
treatment" standard. See, e.g., Batton, 501 F. Supp. at 1176-77; Bukhari, 487 F. Supp. at 
1172; Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1079. But cf Pargo, 894 F. Supp. at 1263 (refusing to 
apply heightened scrutiny to plaintiffs' claims and instead applying only a rational basis 
standard of review). See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text for a general discus­
sion of the standards of review courts apply to equal protection claims and infra notes 
17-22 and accompanying text for a general overview of parity of treatment. 
7. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1681-88 
(1988». 
8. See Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994); Women Prisoners v. Dis­
trict of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994); Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correc­
tional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Neb. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Klinger v. Department 
of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995); Canter­
ino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 869 F.2d 948 
(6th Cir. 1989). 
9. 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994). 
10. Id. at 1229. 
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male prisoners. Part I will give a brief overview of Equal Protec­
tion Clause claims. Part II will explore the congressional intent and 
evolution of Title IX. Part III will discuss the recent Ninth Circuit 
decision in leldness, including the district court opinion and the 
Ninth Circuit's majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV.A will 
briefly discuss the finding of sex discrimination as analyzed by both 
the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV.B will evaluate 
whether female prisoners alleging unlawful disparate treatment in 
prison educational programs in fact fare better under Title IX than 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Part IV.B.2 will consider 
courts' treatment of sex segregation in public schools under tradi­
tional equal protection analysis and in intercollegiate athletic pro­
grams under Title IX. This section will propose that application of 
Title IX within the context of correctional facilities should parallel 
the manner in which the statute has been applied in intercollegiate 
athletics. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EQUAL PROTECfION CLAUSE 
In the past, female inmates have looked to the Equal Protec­
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for relief from alleged 
inequitable treatment in the prison environment.l1 In accordance 
with this clause, plaintiffs claim that they are being denied the equal 
protection of the law, as afforded similarly situated males, on the 
basis of their gender.12 
Under traditional claims of equal protection, courts employ 
either strict scrutinyp intermediate scrutiny,14 or rational basis re­
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The Equal Protection Clause pro­
vides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
12. For an analysis of equal protection claims brought by female inmates, see 
Herbert, supra note 4. 
13. Racial classifications are reviewed with strict scrutiny, which requires that the 
classification be necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest. See 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
Qassifications that burden a fundamental interest are, like racial classifications, also 
subject to strict scrutiny review. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31, 634 
(1969) (holding that right to travel constitutes a fundamental interest). Nevertheless, 
this facet of the Equal Protection Clause is denied to inmates seeking rehabilitation in 
prison because courts have ruled that there is no constitutional right to rehabilitation. 
See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds 
per curiam, sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). In addition, courts have 
ruled similarly with regard to education. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 
(1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,35 (1973) (holding that 
education is not a right created by the Constitution and therefore is not a fundamental 
interest). 
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view15 to determine whether a plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment 
rights have been violated. Generally, classifications based upon sex 
have been reviewed with intermediate scrutiny, thus requiring that 
the classification be substantially related to an important govern­
mental interest.16 
Courts faced with equal protection claims brought by female 
prisoners have adopted a variant of intermediate scrutiny review. 
According to these courts, "'what the Equal Protection Clause re­
quires in a prison setting is parity of treatment ... between male 
and female inmates."'17 In contrast to intermediate scrutiny, parity 
of treatment has a less fixed meaning. Though parity is defined as 
"the quality or state of being equal or equivalent,"18 courts have 
consistently held that parity stands for something less than identity 
of treatment.19 One court has held that in order to comply with the 
parity of treatment standard of compliance, prisons must "provide 
women inmates with treatment and facilities that are substantially 
equivalent to those provided the men-i.e., equivalent in substance 
if not in form-unless their actions, though failing to do so, none­
theless bear a fair and substantial relationship to achievement of 
the [s]tate's correctional objectives."2o 
Despite its promising language, the practical result of the par­
14. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
15. Classifications based on neutral factors are afforded the most leniency in 
terms of satisfying the mandates of equal protection. Subject to "rational basis" review, 
these classifications need only be reasonably related to a legitimate legislative purpose. 
See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979) (holding 
that regulation prohibiting methadone users from working for transit authority was 
constitutional). 
16. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,197-98 (1976). In applying equal protection 
analysis, courts also distinguish between facial and non-facial discrimination. Facial dis­
crimination is subject to intermediate scrutiny and occurs when similarly situated indi­
viduals are classified on the basis of an impermissible characteristic. Personnel Adm'r 
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74 (1979). Non-facial discrimination arises when a neutral 
policy is at issue. Discrimination on the basis of a facially neutral policy will be subject 
to intermediate scrutiny only if the policy has a disparate impact on a protected group 
and was motivated by discriminatory intent. Id. at 273, 276. 
17. Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (quoting 
Barefield v. Leach, No. 10282 slip op. at 37-38 (D.N.M. Dec. 18, 1974». Significantly, 
the parity of treatment standard, so often applied to equal-protection based claims 
raised in the prison environment, originated in Barefield, an unpublished case from the 
District of New Mexico. For a brief overview of the factual setting of Barefield, see 
Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1078-79. 
18. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICfIONARY 856 (1988). 
19. See, e.g., Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174,210 (W.O. Ky. 1982), vacated 
on other grounds, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989); Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1079, 1087. 
20. Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1079. See also Batton v. North Carolina, 501 F. Supp. 
1173,1176 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (quoting Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1079). 
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ity of treatment standard is that, even in cases where a court finds 
that this standard has not been satisfied, proposed remedies are 
often too vague to effectuate any substantive changes in the female 
prisons.21 The worst case scenario is that plaintiffs are wholly 
barred from relief because the legitimatized bases for differentia­
tion of the sexes render male and female prisoners not similarly 
situated.22 The question that will increasingly be asked, both by ag-. 
21. In a class action that began on May 17, 1977, female inmates at Michigan's 
only women's prison brought an equal protection suit against the Department of Cor­
rections. Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1076 (E.D. Mich. 1979). The plaintiffs 
alleged that they were not provided educational, vocational, and employment programs 
comparable to those offered to male inmates within the state. Id. In finding for the 
plaintiffs on a variety of issues, the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan held that, "women [inmates] are entitled to a greater variety of program­
ming than they are currently offered .... [They] have a right to a range and quality of 
programming substantially equivalent to that offered the men." Id. at 1087. 
Eighteen years later, the plaintiffs are still struggling to achieve the objectives of 
equal protection. Glover v. Johnson, 879 F. Supp. 752, 754 & n.2 (D. Mich. 1995). This 
struggle is caused not only by the defendants' "persistent pattern of obfuscation," but, 
no doubt, by the ambiguity of the court's 1979 holding. See also Stephanie Fleischer 
Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Behalf of Women, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,10 
(1995) ("[W]hile several courts have held that inferior programming for women is un­
constitutional, most findings of liability have not resulted in successful remedies. "). 
22. See Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Servs., 824 F. Supp. 1374 (D. 
Neb. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 729 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (At the trial level, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged both Equal Protection 
Clause and Title IX violations. On appeal, however, the only relevant claim before the 
court was the plaintiffs' equal protection claim), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that because of 
the differences in the varying physiological and emotional characteristics of male and 
female inmates, comparing interprison programs for purposes of equal protection anal­
ysis is a "futile exercise." Specifically, the Eighth Circuit stated that: 
[F]emale inmates as a class have special characteristics distinguishing them 
from male inmates, ranging from the fact that they are more likely to be single 
parents with primary responsibility for child rearing to the fact that they are 
more likely to be sexual or physical abuse victims. Male inmates, in contrast, 
are more likely to be violent and predatory than female inmates. 
Thus, the programs at [male and female prisons] reflect separate sets of 
decisions based on entirely different circumstances. When determining pro­
gramming at an individual prison under the restrictions of a limited budget, 
prison officials must make hard choices. They must balance many considera­
tions, ranging from the characteristics of the inmates at that prison to the size 
of the institution, to determine the optimal mix of programs and services. 
Id. at 731-32. 
Ironically, the Eighth Circuit in Klinger intimated that the plaintiffs may have had 
a viable equal protection claim had they alleged "differences in the process by which 
program decisions were made at the prisons" as opposed to "differences in programs 
between prisons." Id. at 732 n.4. Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "male and 
female inmates are similarly situated at the beginning of the decisionmaking process, 
where infinite intervening variables have not yet excessively tainted the comparison 
between prisons nor are officials' substantive administrative decisions yet at issue." 
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grieved female inmates and prison administrators, is whether wo­
men prisoners fare better under Title IX than they have previously 
fared under the Equal Protection Clause. 
II. BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that 
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex­
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub­
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance."23 In accordance with the 
language of the statute, sex discrimination is a prerequisite to Title 
IX's application. Stated differently, Title IX applies only to sex dis­
crimination and does not address any of the various forms of dis-
Id. The Eighth Circuit, however, neither explained why differences rendering male and 
female inmates not similarly situated (Le., different mental and emotional states and 
differences in the sizes of prisons) are not present at the decisionmaking stage, nor how 
differences in the psychological states of male and female inmates prohibit a compari­
son of programming. The incongruities in the Eighth Circuit's reasoning suggest that 
the "futility of comparison" of prison programs is attributable to procedural, not sub­
stantive, inequities. See Seldin, supra note 21, at 9 for further analysis as to why the 
Eighth Circuit's decision in Klinger was incorrect. 
The reasoning espoused by Klinger is characteristic of the rationale traditionally 
relied upon by courts when faced with the difficult task of determining when segrega­
tion becomes sexually discriminatory and, therefore, unlawful. See, e.g., Timm v. 
Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a men's and women's state 
prison were not similarly situated for purposes of privacy rights because of different 
security concerns at the two institutions), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991); Wark V. 
Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295, 1298-99 (1st Cir. 1972) (upholding differential penalties for 
male and female escapees because separate facilities with different security characteris­
tics render them not similarly situated); Pargo V. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1252, 1261­
62 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (relying on Klinger to hold that male and female inmates are not 
similarly situated and that, therefore, female prisoners' equal protection based suit was 
without merit), affd, 69 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 1995). See generally Arditi, supra note 2, at 
1229-54. 
When asked to declare prison protocol unlawful courts have also cited to the intri­
cacies of prison administration and the lack of judicial expertise in the running of pris­
ons. See Thrner V. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) ("Running a prison is an 
inordinately difficult undertaking ... [and] [w]here a state penal system is involved, 
federal courts have ... additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison 
authorities."); Bell V. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (noting that the judgment exer­
cised by prison administrators in striking a balance between the rights of prisoners and 
the demands of institutional security is to be given great deference); Jones V. North 
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 127-28 (1977) (rejecting claims that 
restrictions on prison inmate labor union violated inmates' civil rights and recognizing 
that it is proper to defer to the professional expertise of corrections officials regarding 
penological objectives). 
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). 
343 1996] TITLE IX AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 
crimination prohibited by other statutes.24 
The intent with which Title IX was enacted, as well as the 
premise for its statutory construction, are useful in determining how 
to apply Title IX in the context of the prison environment.25 Sena­
tor Birch Bayh, chief sponsor and floor manager of Title IX, spoke 
of the statute as "a strong and comprehensive measure [that] is 
needed to provide women with solid legal protection from persis­
tent, pernicious discrimination which is serving to perpetuate sec­
ond-class citizenship for American women."26 Thus, from its 
enactment, Title IX was envisioned to be a remedial tool for victims 
of sex discrimination. 
Generally, Title IX defines educational institutions as "any 
public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any 
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education."27 
Thus, Title IX applies to both traditional and non-traditional educa­
tional institutions. The statute does, however, exempt certain insti­
tutions from its scope of coverage. Such exemptions include 
religious organizations, military training programs, single-sex public 
educational institutions, fraternities and sororities, boy or girl con­
ferences, father-son or mother-daughter activities, and beauty pag­
eant awards.28 In light of the rather extensive list of exceptions, the 
absence of prisons among them is noteworthy. 
Though Title IX was adopted in 1972, final implementing regu­
lations did not become effective until July 21, 1975.29 These regula­
tions provide that Title IX was "designed to eliminate . . . 
discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or ac­
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance."3o Title IX's imple­
24. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 u.s.c. 
§ 2000e (1988 & Supp. V 1993». Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
§ 2000e-2(a)(I). See also infra note 35 for the language of Title VI, 42 U.S.c. § 2000d 
(1988). 
25. For a discussion of the statutory purpose and legislative history of Title IX, 
see Claudia S. Lewis, Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Harmonizing 
Its Restrictive Language with Its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1043 
(1983). 
26. 118 CoNG. REc. 5804 (1972). 
27. § 1681(c). 
28. These exemptions correspond to §§ 1681(a)(3)-(9), respectively. 
29. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1995). 
30. Id. (emphasis added). According to the Supreme Court in Cannon v. Univer­
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), Congress intended Title IX to accomplish this 
objective in two manners: (1) by prohibiting institutions engaging iri discriminatory 
practices from receiving federal funds; or (2) by awarding individual relief to private 
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menting regulations, nevertheless, cite to specific Lllstances in which 
complete "elimination" of discrimination is not mandated. Three 
areas in which Title IX permits recipients of federal funds to differ­
entiate between the sexes are opportunities for foreign scholarship 
and study abroad,31 housing,32 and athletics.33 
Title IX is a near mirror image of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.34 The only difference between the two statutes is the 
type of discrimination prohibited.35 The similarity in language be­
tween Title VI and Title IX is no accident. Congress specifically 
used Title VI as a model in drafting Title IX.36 
In the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 198737 (the "Act"), Con­
gress explicitly recognized that the cohesiveness of Title IX and its 
sibling statute extends beyond mere similarity of language. The Act 
clarified that Title IX and Title VI have a broader scope than that 
previously assigned to them by the Supreme Court in Grove City 
litigants (e.g., "requiring an institution to accept an applicant who had been improperly 
excluded"). Id. at 704-05. 
31. A recipient educational institution may administer foreign assistance and 
study abroad opportunities, though restricted to members of one sex, as long as the 
recipient "makes available reasonable opportunities for similar studies for members of 
the other sex." 734 C.F.R. § 106.31(c) (1995). 
32. A recipient can provide separate housing on the basis of sex if, "when com­
pared to that provided to students of the other sex, ... [it is] (i) [p ]roportionate in 
quantity to the number of students of that sex applying for such housing; and (ii) 
[c]omparable in quality and cost to the student." § 106.32(b)(2). 
33. Pursuant to section 106.41(b), 
a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex 
where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity 
involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a 
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no 
such teams for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for mem­
bers of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex 
must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a 
contact sport. 
Id. 
With regard to athletics, the regulations also provide that "[a] recipient which oper­
ates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall pro­
vide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes." § 106.41 (c). 
34. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 2oo0d 
(1988». 
35. 'Section 601 of Title VI provides that "[n]o person ... shall, on the ground of 
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." Id. 
36. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 695-96 (1979). 
37. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at scattered sections of 20, 
29, and 42 U.S. C.). 
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College v. Bell.38 Under Grove, discriminatory practices were pro­
hibited only in the particular "program or activity" receiving fed­
eral financial assistance.39 The Act reversed this narrow 
construction by declaring that a recipient of federal funds must be 
free of discrimination institution-wide.40 
With Congress' rejection of Grove has come an unprecedented 
movement towards equality between the sexes in college athletics. 
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, coupled with the 1979 
Policy Interpretation of Title IX,41 ("Policy Interpretation") issued 
by the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education 
("OCR"), have had an enormous impact on colleges and universi­
ties nationwide.42 The Policy Interpretation enumerates factors and 
standards to be assessed in determining whether an institution's in­
tercollegiate athletics program complies with Title IX.43 In accord­
ance with this Policy Interpretation, the touchstone of Title IX 
compliance for intercollegiate athletic programs is equality of op­
portunity to participate.44 Using this standard as leverage, female 
athletes increasingly are bringing suit against their universities seek­
ing reinstatement of women's athletic programs eliminated due to 
budgetary restraints.45 No longer shielded by the excuse that their 
athletic programs do not receive federal funds directly, many insti­
tutions have been forced to create level playing fields for their male 
and female athletes.46 
38. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
39. Id. at 572-73. 
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988). 
41. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). 
42. For an analysis of TItle IX compliance in intercollegiate athletics, see Jill K. 
Johnson, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretation of 
the Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REv. 553 (1994). 
43. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413. 
44. Id. at 71,414. 
45. See Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993) (suing 
for reinstatement of varsity women's softball), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. 
Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 580 (1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (suing for 
reinstatement of women's varsity gymnastics and field hockey teams), affd, 7 F.3d 332 
(3d Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.!. 1992) (suing for rein­
statement of women's varsity volleyball and gymnastics), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 
1993). 
46. See generally Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834 (affirming district court's order that 
Colorado State University must reinstate varsity women's softball, hire a coach, and 
provide a field, equipment, and uniforms); Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 343-44 (affirming dis­
trict court's order to reinstate women's gymnastics and field hockey teams and refusing 
to allow defendant to modify that order by replacing women's gymnastics with women's 
soccer); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discre­
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Why this a Policy Interpretation was promulgated specifically 
for athletics and not for entities within the scope of TItle IX univer­
sally may be explained by any number of reasons.47 The more ap­
propriate inquiry, in light of the advantageous results such an 
interpretation has had in effectuating TItle IX, is whether similar 
success may be achieved by female prisoners. Women inmates in 
Oregon recently relied on Title IX in their suit against the Depart~ 
ment of Corrections alleging discrimination in educational pro­
grams and activities offered at the state women's prison.48 In 
comparison to intercollegiate athletics however, the influence TItle 
IX has had to date within the confines of correctional facilities is 
been nominal. This is attributable in part to the lack of a clear man­
date, such as OCR's Policy Interpretation, with which to apply Title 
IX.49 
III. DISCUSSION OF JELDNESS v. PEARCE50 
A. Factual Setting 
In leldness, female inmates incarcerated in the state of Oregon 
brought a class action against the Oregon State Department of Cor­
rections administration alleging sex discrimination in the educa­
tional and vocational programs offered to them.51 The class sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and all 
present and future inmates of the Oregon Women's Correctional 
Center ("OWCC") for alleged violations of Title IX and the Equal 
Protection Clause.52 The following six educational and vocational 
training programs were claimed to be discriminatory: prison indus­
tries, apprenticeships, vocational programs, college courses, a farm 
annex, and a forest work camp.53 
The structure of the Oregon state prison system is not unlike 
the majority of prison systems throughout the United States in that 
tion in temporarily reinstating the women's volleyball and gymnastics teams at Brown 
University). 
47. The POlicy Interpretation is attributable in large part to the overwhelming 
number of complaints alleging discrimination in athletics received by OCR by the end 
of July, 1978. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413. 
48. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994). 
49. See generally id. at 1226-30. 
50. 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994). 
51. Id. at 1222. For purposes of this Note, references to educational programs 
provided in the prison context include vocational programs. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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it is segregated by sex.54 It consists of six facilities. OWCC, a me­
dium security prison housing approximately 200 female inmates, is 
the only one of the six facilities that houses women.55 The remain­
ing five facilities are exclusively male. The three largest of the male 
prisons are: (1) the Oregon State Penitentiary ("OSP"), a maximum 
security prison accommodating approximately 1,800 male prisoners; 
(2) the Eastern Oregon Corrections Institute ("EOCI"), a medium 
security prison accommodating approximately 1,200 male prisoners; 
and (3) the Oregon State Correctional Institution ("OSCI"), a me­
dium security prison accommodating approximately 1,000 male 
prisoners.56 The Oregon State prison system also runs a Farm An­
nex and a Forest Work Camp accommodating 225 and 110 male 
inmates, respectively.57 
The plaintiff class did not challenge the right of the Oregon 
prison system to maintain sexually segregated prisons. 58 Rather, 
the class claim stemmed from the fact that, although some form of 
educational programs were offered in all facilities, the access to par­
ticular programs differed for male and female inmates.59 Accord­
ingly, the plaintiffs impliedly argued that they should be allowed to 
attend programs not available at the women's facility, at the men's 
prison, or, in the alternative, to be offered more of these programs 
at OWCC. 
OWCC, the women's prison, offered two vocational classes, 
cosmetology and office administration, while OSP and OSCI, two 
of the men's facilities, each offered twelve vocational classes.6o 
Although women were allowed to participate in the vocational 
classes at OSCI, they had to be transported and, therefore, were 
subjected to skin searches upon entering and exiting classes.61 Con­
sequently, women inmates who were allowed to take classes at 
OSCI were frequently late for class.62 In addition, men were 
awarded merit pay for their participation in the vocational pro­
54. See Arditi, supra note 2, for an analysis of the constitutionality of sexually 
segregated prisons and a structural breakdown of fifteen state prison systems, including 
Oregon. 
55. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1222. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 1224. 
59. Id. at 1222. 
60. Id. at 1222-24. 
61. Id. at 1223. 
62. Id. 
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grams, whereas women were not.63 OWCC offered no apprentice­
ship programs.64 Although female inmates had access to certain 
apprenticeships at aSCI, they were specifically excluded from the 
welding, painting, cabinet making, and plumbing programs.65 Wo­
men were wholly precluded from participating in programs at the 
forest work camp and the farm annex.66 
B. 	 The Opinion of the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon 
In 1986, the plaintiffs' class action went before the United 
States District Court for the District of Oregon in a bench trial 
where the defendants prevailed on all but one issue.67 After an ap­
peal restricted to procedural issues,68 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the trial 
court.69 The defendants motioned for summary judgment on re­
mand. In its order, the district court drew the following legal con­
clusions relevant to the focus of this Note: (1) parity of treatment is 
all that is required in claims brought within the context of the 
prison setting under Title IX; and (2) "'penological necessity'" is a 
"'complete defense'" to Title IX disparate impact claims.70 
Using these standards, the court entered partial summary judg­
ment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' claims regarding the 
prison industries, forest work camp, and farm annex programs. The 
district court attributed job and work program disparities in the 
prison industries program to the "custody status," as opposed to the 
gender, of the female inmates.71 With respect to the forest work 
camp, the court found that because the camp environment provided 
minimal supervision of the inmates, resultant "safety problems" 
63. 	 Id. at 1224. 
64. 	 Id.· at 1223. 
65. 	 Id. at .1224. 
66. 	 Id. at 1223. 
67. 	 Id. 
68. On appeal, the plaintiff class argued that "the magistrate abused his discretion 
both by granting the prison administration's motion for modification of the pretrial 
order and by departing from the modified order at trial." Jeldness v. Watson, 857 F.2d 
1478, 1988 WL 96600 at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 1988). The class also argued that the 
magistrate abused his discretion "by ignoring his decision to place the burden of prov­
ing the modified facts on the prison administration." Id. at *2. 
69. 	 Id. at *3. 
70. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1223 (quoting unpublished 1986 decision by the United 
States District Court for the District of Oregon (Hogan, J.». 
71. 	 Id. 
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mandated the exclusion of women.72 Thus, Title IX was not vio­
lated because "safety problems" satisfied the "'substantial legiti­
mate penological necessity'" requirement of the statute.73 The 
court reached similar conclusions regarding the farm annex pro­
gram. Because women were prohibited from residing at the farm 
annex, their low to non-existent participation levels in this program 
were "'justified by the substantial legitimate penological necessity 
of separately housing inmates on the basis of sex. "'74 
The remaining disputed issues proceeded to a non-jury trial, 
subject to the same legal standards adopted by the court in its ruling 
on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district 
court found that the security and supervision problems posed by 
women's participation in the mechanical apprenticeships (i.e., weld­
ing, painting, cabinet making, and plumbing) constituted a legiti­
mate penological necessity and thus did not violate Title IX.75 As 
to vocational courses, the district court concluded that the programs 
were" 'equal in substance and form."'76 Moreover, it held that the 
offering of cosmetology and office administration-the only two vo­
cational courses offered at OWCC-"did not 'reflect gender based 
stereotypes' but was based on the size of the prisons."77 Addition­
ally, penological necessity was found to justify women inmates' late 
arrival at OSCI vocational classes, longer course completion times, 
and skin searches.78 Lastly, the trial court found that although 
fewer lower-division college courses were offered to women in com­
parison to men, they had "equal access" to upper-division courses, 
and the class to inmate ratio was greater at OWCC.79 
The only issue on which the district court found in favor of the 
plaintiff class was in connection with the compensatory aspect of 
vocational programs. The court held that the allowance of merit 
pay to men, but not women, for their vocational work violated Title 
IX.80 On the basis of this finding, the district court awarded attor­
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. (quoting unpublished 1986 decision by the United States District Court for 
the District of Oregon (Hogan, J.». 
75. Id. at 1224. 
76. Id. (quoting unpublished 1986 decision by the United States District Court for 
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ney's fees to the plaintiffs.81 
C. 	 The Majority Opinion for the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit 
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit on grounds that the district court had erred in 
reaching two of the legal conclusions that were applied to its find­
ings of fact regarding Title IX. The plaintiffs claimed it was error 
for the trial court: (1) to interpret Title IX as requiring only parity, 
as opposed to equality, of treatment in the context of prison educa­
tional programs and activities; and (2) to allow penological neces­
sity as a complete defense to Title IX claims.82 
1. 	 Title IX Applies to Prisons 
Prior to addressing the issues raised by the plaintiffs on appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit first established the applicability of Title IX claims 
to educational programs and activities offered by correctional facili­
ties. In a case of first impression before the Ninth Circuit, the ma­
jority in leldness rejected the defendants' various arguments that 
the scope of Title IX was limited to co-educational facilities or insti­
tutions in which participants had freedom of movement.83 Instead, 
the majority concluded that the plain language of the statute, the 
l:lbsence of a specific exemption for prisons in light of five specifi­
cally enumerated exceptions, and the inclusion of correctional facil­
ities in a congressional pronouncement regarding the need for the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, mandated that prisons fall 
within the scope of Title IX.84 
81. 	 Id. at 1223. 
82. Id. at 1222. The plaintiffs also claimed on appeal that it was error for the 
district court to hold that the Equal Protection Clause immunizes discriminatory poli­
cies that are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 1231. The 
majority stated, however, that it did not have to resolve this constitutional issue since 
TItle IX sufficiently addressed all of the plaintiffs' claims. Id. In support of this conclu­
sion, the majority cited to Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974), which held that 
"a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive 
nonconstitutional ground is available." The United States District Court for the Dis­
trict of Columbia also recently resolved nearly identical claims solely on the basis of 
TItle IX. See Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 678 (D.D.C. 
1994) (holding that because "the remedial devices in TItle IX sufficiently cover discrimi­
nation in educational programs," a review of those programs under the Equal Protec­
tion Clause was unnecessary). 
83. 	 Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1226. 
84. Id. at 1224-26. The defendants never contested that the Oregon prison system 
received federal funds. Id. at 1226. 
351 1996] TITLE IX AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit cited to two district court cases 
which specifically recognized TItle IX claims brought by state pris­
oners.85 Although the majority ultimately concluded that it is the 
duty of the judiciary to analyze TItle IX within the prison environ­
ment, it emphasized that "the application of [the statute's] regula­
tions must be consistent with the basic needs of prisons and the 
bona fide reasons for segregation of the genders in prisons."86 
2. 	 The Majority's Analysis of Title IX's Standard of 
Compliance 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that par­
ity of treatment, as opposed to equality of treatment, is the proper 
standard of compliance for Title IX.87 In a two-tier analysis,88 the 
85. Id. at 1224-25. The two cases cited by the court of appeals were: Canterino v. 
Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174,210 (W.O. Ky. 1982) (suggesting that TItle IX, at least in the 
context of the prison environment, requires a more demanding level of compliance than 
the Equal Protection Clause), vacated on other grounds, 869 F.2d 948 (6th CiT. 1989) 
and Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931, 940, 943 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that female 
prisoners had a cause of action for damages against state prison officials under TItle IX 
in light of their allegations of intentional discrimination). 
86. 	 leldness, 30 F.3d at 1226. 
87. Id. at 1228. This argument was derived from the defendants' contention that 
TItle IX "requires only the level of protection offered by the Equal Protection Clause." 
Id. at 1226. According to the defendants, TItle IX can be equated with the Equal Pro­
tection Clause because "TItle VI is coextensive with the Constitution, and does not 
mandate more than what is required under [that clause]." Id. at 1227. In essence, the 
defendants argued that, in contrast to TItle VI which prohibits racial discrimination, 
TItle IX prohibits sex discrimination. See supra note 35 for the language of TItle VI. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, racial classifications are reviewed with strict scru­
tiny, while gender classifications are reviewed with only intermediate scrutiny. See 
supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text for the various levels of review employed by 
courts analyzing equal protection claims. Thus, by using TItle VI as a thread to connect 
TItle IX to the Equal Protection Clause, the defendants asserted that TItle IX must be 
interpreted to require a level of compliance comparable to intermediate scrutiny as 
opposed to strict scrutiny. According to the defendants, this comparable level is parity 
of treatment in the prison context. leldness, 30 F.3d at 1227. See supra notes 17-22 and 
accompanying text for a general overview of parity. of treatment. 
88. In reaching its ultimate conclusion that TItle IX demands more than parity of 
treatment, the majority emphasized the discrepancy of treatment between gender and 
race under the Equal Protection Clause. It then used this discrepancy to highlight the 
similarity in language between TItle VI and TItle IX. It is this similarity that led the 
court to conclude that TItle IX and TItle VI "should, as a matter of statutory interpreta­
tion, be read to require the same levels of protection and equality. They should not be 
read to require different levels of protection because the Equal Protection Clause is 
interpreted differently for race than for gender." leldness, 30 F.3d at 1227-28. In sup­
port of its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit cited Canterino, 546 F. Supp. at 174, in which 
TItle IX was read as requiring more than parity of treatment. 
The Canterino district court opinion, focusing largely on plaintiffs' equal protection 
claims, held that the Equal Protection Clause's requirement of parity of treatment "may 
352 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Yol. 18:337 
majority in leldness held that while "prison educational programs 
subject to Title IX must be 'equally' available to male and female 
inmates,"89 equality does not mean "strict one-for-one identity."90 
The court reasoned that security concerns and the differing sizes 
and locations of the prisons in Oregon are extenuating factors that 
arise exclusively within the context of the prison setting,91 Addi­
tionally, the majority recognized that TItle IX's implementing regu­
lations make provisions for certain entities in which strict identity of 
treatment is either inappropriate or infeasible.92 It reasoned that 
because Title IX allows institutions to "'provide separate housing 
on the basis of sex"'93 as long as it is proportionate in quantity and 
comparable in quality, TItle IX does not require "gender-integrated 
classes in prisons. "94 The majority also emphasized the fact that 
under TItle IX, athletic programs need only provide" 'equal oppor­
tunities'" to athletes95 and that institutions administering scholar­
ships from sexually segregated foreign institutions need only 
provide" 'reasonable opportunities for similar studies"'96 in order 
to comply with the statute. Analogizing these sex-segregated enti­
ties to correctional facilities, the leldness court concluded that "wo­
men [inmates at OWCC] must have reasonable opportunities for 
similar studies and must have an equal opportunity to participate in 
programs of comparable quality."97 
The majority refrained from adopting a black letter rule defin­
ing what satisfies this standard. Instead, it marked strict identity of 
be met in a number of different ways, as long as the opportunities available to women 
are substantially equivalent 'in substance ifnot inform' to those accorded men." Id. at 
210 (quoting Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075,1079 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (emphasis 
added». Conversely, it interpreted TItle IX as mandating "equivalent programs 'in 
form as well as in substance' to similarly situated women." Id. (quoting Glover, 478 F. 
Supp. at 1079). The court clarified that this "mean[s), at a minimum, that a consistent 
good faith effort must be made to include female inmates in the benefits of all programs 
funded in part with federal dollars." Id. Coupled with its plain language analysis, the 
majority in leldness seized upon this decision to hold "like the court in Canterino, ... 
that prison educational programs subject to TItle IX must be equally available to male 
and female inmates." leldness, 30 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis added). 
89. leldness, 30 F.3d at 1228. 
90. Id. at 1229. 
91. Id. at 1228. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.32(b)(I) (1995». 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (quoting § 106.41(c». 
96. Id. (quoting § 106.31(c». 
97. Id. at 1229. For purposes of this Note, the standard of compliance adopted by 
the majority will be referred to as "equality of opportunity" or "equal opportunity." 
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treatment and the exclusion of women from one half of the appren­
ticeship programs as polar extremities on Title IX's continuum of 
compliance.98 According to the majority, the former constituted 
absolute compliance and the latter noncompliance. Equality of op­
portunity impliedly lay somewhere in between. The court empha­
sized that while programs may differ depending on "interest and 
need," the number of programs and activities must be proportion­
ate "not just to the total number of inmates, but to the number of 
inmates desiring to take educational programs."99 
3. Penological Necessity Is Not a Complete Defense to Title 
IX 
Although the majority held that Title IX does not mandate 
gender integration, it rejected the district court's finding that peno­
logical necessity was a complete defense to the disparities in Ore­
gon's prison educational programs.lOO The district court had 
formulated the penological necessity defense "by analogy" to the 
business necessity defense available in Title VII's disparate impact 
cases.101 The majority intimated that this analogy was remiss be­
cause the plaintiffs' claims in leldness were in the nature of dispa­
rate treatment, not disparate impact.102 Nevertheless, the Ninth 
Circuit expressly refrained from resolving "whether the proper 
analysis for all of the educational programs in this case is disparate 
treatment or disparate impact."103 Instead the court declared that it 
"need only restate [its] conclusion that penological necessity is not a 
defense in a Title IX case, but only a factor in how Title IX is ap­
plied in prisons."104 According to the majority, this conclusion was 
based, on the fact that Title IX, unlike Title VII, does not contain an 
98. Id. 
99. [d. 
100. Id. at 1229-30. 
101. Id. at 1229. 
102. Id. at 1230. In the context of Title VII discrimination suits, courts have de­
veloped three distinct theories of liability: individual disparate treatment, systemic dis­
parate treatment, and disparate impact. Under each theory, plaintiffs have the initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The theory of liability al­
leged not only determines what plaintiffs must show in order to satisfy their burden, but 
also gauges whether defendants will have the burden of production or persuasion at 
trial. For an overview of the burden-shifting framework of each of these three theories 
of liability, see Tracy Anbinder Baron, Comment, Keeping Women Out of the Executive 
Suite: The Courts' Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level lobs, 143 U. PA. L. 
REv. 267, 284-87 (1994). 
103. leldness, 30 F.3d at 1230. 
104. Id. See Baron, supra note 102, for the various Title VII theories of liability. 
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explicit statutory defense to disparate treatment cases.105 
In sum, in determining whether the plaintiffs had been discrim­
inated against on the basis of sex, the majority avoided traditional 
discrimination law analysis106 and premised its conclusion largely 
upon Title IX's implementing regulations. Nevertheless, the court 
emphasized that its role in interpreting Title IX was merely to "de­
fine the boundaries of what is required of the executive branch by 
Congress and by the [C]onstitution."107 It left the district court the 
"difficult task" of determining how to balance security concerns 
unique to prisons with the requirements of Title IX. 
D. Judge Kleinfeld's Dissent 
Judge Andrew Kleinfeld dissented in Jeldness .108 He agreed 
with the majority's conclusion that Title IX applied to prison educa­
tional programs and activities and with the majority's ruling that 
awarding merit pay to male inmates, but not to female inmates, vio­
lated Title IX.109 Beyond this, Judge Kleinfeld and the majority 
parted company. 
In contrast to the majority, the dissent reasoned that Title IX 
was inapplicable to the plaintiffs' case since the prerequisite dis­
crimination was lacking. According to the dissent, the plaintiff class 
did not suffer sex discrimination by being denied access to certain 
programs, but rather, suffered discrimination on the basis of "loca­
tion," "security concerns," and other penological necessities. l1O 
Thus, the dissent concluded that the plaintiffs may have suffered 
discrimination, but it was not the type proscribed by Title IX. Ac­
cordingly, they should have been denied relief under that statute. 
Judge Kleinfeld also sharply criticized the majority's definition 
of equality, which in his opinion transformed state prison officials 
into judicial puppets, forcing them to mimic the policies of federal 
judges.111 The dissent further accused the majority of gauging the 
105. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1230. Section 703(e) of TItle VII permits disparate treat­
ment of individuals "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988). 
106. For a brief overview of the various discrimination law analyses, see supra 
note 102. 
107. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1229. 
108. Id. at 1231. 
109. Id. at 1232. 
110. Id. at 1234. 
111. Id. at 1235. In Judge Kleinfeld's words, "[b]ecause of the amorphousness of 
the majority's 'equality' standard ... Oregon prison administration will continue to be 
355 1996] TITLE IX AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 
definition of equality on inmates' desires.l12 According to the dis­
sent, if the rehabilitative purpose of incarceration is to be achieved, 
administrative determinations should be made by prison officials, 
not by prisoners. 
Moreover, the dissent asserted that even if Title IX requires 
equality of treatment, the only usable definition of this term is its 
ordinary meaning of "expenditure per prisoner, or course availabil­
ity per prisoner."113 According to the dissent, the Oregon state 
prison system satisfies both of these criteria. Ironically, the dissent 
concluded that it is, in fact, Oregon's male prisoners who are the 
victims of discrimination.114 To illustrate his point, Judge Kleinfeld 
constructed the following chart based upon the district court's find­
ings of facts: 
number of number of inmates courses per 
courses inmates per course inmate 
OWCC (women) 18 213 12 .084 











Translating these numbers into statistics, the dissent 
emphasized that while only "5 % of Oregon's prisoners are female, 
... 25% of the courses offered are in the women's prison."116 
Similarly, OWCC "has almost 2 112 times as many courses per 
prisoner as the most generous male prison, OSCI, and over 13 times 
as many as EOCI, the least generous."1l7 Accordingly, applying 
the majority's "equality of opportunity" standard would be "like 
saying that there should be as much opera in Ketchikan as in New 
York."llB 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Finding of Sex Discrimination 
Whether the plaintiffs' Title IX claim in leldness warranted a 
subject to the power of federal courts, untrammeled by a usable legal standard, to as­
sure that female prisoners obtain 'equality' of educational opportunities." Id. 
112. Id. at 1233. 
113. Id. at 1232. 
114. Id. at 1233. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1232. 
117. Id. at 1233. 
118. Id. at 1234. 
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finding of unUlwful sex discrimination is complicated by the fact 
that prisons are segregated by sex for legitimate penological rea­
sons. As noted by the majority, "[p]risons are different from other 
institutions to which Title IX applies. Security is an important con­
cern. And sex segregation is the accepted norm."119 This acknowl­
edged segregation of the sexes was a point of contention and 
confusion for the district court, as well as for the majority and dis­
sent in leldness, in determining whether female prisoners at OWCC 
had in fact been discriminated against on the basis of their sex.120 
This difficulty was compounded by the fact that, at the trial level, 
the plaintiffs did not limit their allegations of discriminatory treat­
ment to one particular male institution. As such, the district court 
was forced to evaluate whether discrimination was present in six 
types of programming at five male facilities.121 
The task of determining whether the prerequisite sex discrimi­
nation was present in leldness becomes much easier when analyzed 
strictly with respect to OSCI, the men's prison most similar to 
OWCC.u2 Because OWCC offered no' apprenticeship programs, 
female prisoners had access to certain apprenticeships at OSCI but 
often arrived late for classes.123 They were, however, expressly de­
119. Id. at 1228. 
120. The dissent explicitly recognized that "[ t ]he difficulty in applying the law 
against discrimination in educational programs to prisons arises from the separation of 
the sexes into separate male and female prisons." Id. at 1234. 
Although the presence of "sex discrimination" was almost assumed by the major­
ity, it is discussed here in some detail since the analysis of this question will have a 
serious impact on future applications of Title IX within the prison environment. Courts 
may use the absence of sex discrimination, as did the dissent in Jeldness, to wholly 
preclude the application of Title IX. 
The Equal Protection Clause has been similarly applied to bar recovery. See, e.g., 
Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948, 954 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that "[a] claim of sex 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause requires a finding of gender-based 
discrimination" and that the plaintiffs did not meet this standard of proof because "both 
men and women are included in the class of people who may be denied study and work 
release"). 
121. See supra parts III.A-B. 
122. See infra part IV.B.2 for an analysis of why compliance with Title IX should 
be assessed solely with respect to "similarly situated" men and women prisoners. In 
Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 675-78 (D.D.C. 1994), the 
court compared "similarly situated" women at Lorton Minimum Security Annex with 
"similarly situated" males at the Minimum Facility, and "similarly situated" women at 
the Correctional Treatment Facility with "similarly situated" males at the Occoquan, 
Central, and Medium facilities. The court's determination that prisoners at these facili­
ties were similarly situated was made on the basis of "similar custody levels, sentence 
structures and purposes of incarceration"). 
123. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1223. See also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
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nied access to four mechanical trade apprenticeships at OSCI.124 
The district court concluded that their exclusion from these pro­
grams was a "legitimate penological necessity," since co-educating 
the genders posed "supervision problems."125 While the exact na­
ture of these problems was not specified, it is probable that Ore­
gon's prison administration denied females access to the four 
apprenticeships out of a fear that there would be fraternization be­
tween the genders. In other words, the rationale for their exclusion 
impliedly arose from a concern that female prisoners' "very wo­
manhood would ... directly undermine"126 security at the male 
prison. This, according to the Ninth Circuit in leldness and accord­
ing to the United States Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson,127 
is overt sex discrimination, since female prisoners are being treated 
differently on the basis of their gender,l28 not, as the dissent in leld­
ness categorically argued, on the basis of some neutral factor like 
"custody status," "confinement," or "literacy. "129 
In Dothard, the plaintiff brought a class action against the Ala­
bama Board of Corrections under TItle VII and the Equal Protec­
tion Clause, alleging gender discrimination after her application for 
a prison guard position was rejected.130 The plaintiff challenged, as 
124. ieldness, 30 F.3d at 1223. 
125. Id. at 1224. 
126. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977). 
127. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
128. Id. at 334. 
129. ieldness, 30 F.3d at 1234. With respect to the finding of sex discrimination, 
the dissent reasoned that denying female prisoners access to programs at the various 
male prisons was not (and impliedly could never be) gender discrimination, but merely 
discrimination on the basis of considerations like "location within the state, confine­
ment, ... [and] literacy." Id. Accordingly, the dissent concluded that TItle IX did not 
apply to the plaintiffs' claims. Id. 
The dissent was correct in reasoning that precluding women inmates from taking 
classes at male institutions is not necessarily sex discrimination. For example, it would 
be location discrimination to deny female prisoners at OWCC access to programs at a 
particular men's institution because the distance separating the female from the male 
prison made travel to and from impracticable. Nevertheless, the dissent would be hard 
pressed to reason that explicitly excluding women prisoners access to the mechanical 
trade apprenticeships at aSCI was anything other than gender-based discrimination. 
Specifically, their exclusion could not be "location" or "confinement" discrimination 
since women were already attending some classes at aSCI, nor could it be "literacy" 
discrimination since the programs were mechanical in nature. The dissent's conclusion 
then that the majority in ieldness erred in finding sex discrimination stems from its 
categorical analysis of whether denying women prisoner's access to programs at all of 
the various men's prisons was discriminatory. The inherent weakness of that conclusion 
becomes obvious when the reasons for precluding female prisoners access to programs 
are examined with reference to the particular men's prison and program at issue. 
130. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323-24. See supra note 24 for the scope of TItle VII. 
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sexually discriminatory, an Alabama regulation that prohibited the 
hiring of female prison guards in certain contact positions at all 
male prisons.131 The Court determined that excluding female cor­
rectional officers from contact positions was sex discrimination. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that this discrimination was justified as 
a bona fide occupational qualification under section 703( e) of Title 
VII.132 The Court thus permitted the exclusion of women from 
contact positions at male prisons.133 
In contrast to Title VII, the majority in leldness emphasized 
that "Title IX contains no explicit statutory exemption such as [a 
bona fide occupational qualification]."l34 Accordingly, the majority 
concluded that because the.sex discrimination inherent in providing 
disparate educational opportunities to similarly situated135 male 
and female prisoners could not be justified under an affirmative de­
fense, it necessarily violated Title IX.136 In light of this finding, the 
majority further concluded that penological necessity could only b~ 
a factor in how Title IX is applied. Specifically, the court held that 
where the genders are educated separately, Title IX requires that a 
balance be maintained between similady situated prisoners.137 
131. Dothard, 433 u.s. at 324-26. The Court described contact positions as those 
"positions requiring continual close physical proximity to inmates of the institution." 
Id. at 325. 
132. Id. at 334. The Court cited the "rampant violence" and "jungle atmosphere" 
of Alabama's prisons, the scattering of sex offenders throughout prison facilities, under­
staffing, and dormitory-style living arrangements as factors that compromised a fe­
male's ability to safely and efficiently perform her job as a prison guard. Id. at 334-36. 
See supra note 105 for the language of § 703(e) of Title VII. 
133. Dothard, 433 u.s. at 336. 
134. leldness, 30 F.3d at 1230. See also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988); 44 Fed. 
Reg. 71,413 (1979). 
135. See infra note 137. 
136. leldness, 30 F.3d at 1230. See Seldin, supra note 21, at 7 n.39, for a list of 
courts holding, similar to leldness, that unequal prison conditions between the male and 
female prisoners is a gender-based classification. 
137. leldness, 30 F.3d at 1229. When the majority in leldness defined the bound­
aries of Title IX compliance, it did so specifically with reference to apprenticeship pro­
grams at aSCI, the male institution most similar to awcc in terms of size and security 
level. Specifically, in response to the district court's finding that it was lawful to deny 
women access to four mechanical apprenticeships at aSCI when they were allowed to 
participate in five vocational apprenticeships at that same prison, the majority stated 
that: 
Strict one-for-one identity of classes may not be required by the regulations. 
But there must be reasonable opportunities for similar studies at the women's 
prison and women must have an equal opportunity to participate in educa­
tional programs .... [TJotally denying women access to half the apprenticeship 
opportunities men have would seem to violate the regulations. In this case, 
women were denied access to all of the mechanical trade apprenticeships. 
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The majority's analysis in leldness suggests that when ag­
grieved female prisoners bring sex discrimination claims on the ba­
sis of Title IX, courts will no longer be able to hold categorically 
that the prerequisite sex discrimination is lacking138 or that the law­
ful segregation of the sexes renders all male and female inmates not 
similarly situated, thereby justifying all disparate treatment.139 Pur­
suant to Title IX, male and female inmates residing at similar facili­
ties must be afforded equality of opportunity in educational 
programs.l40 Nevertheless, the majority did not clearly define how 
to achieve this standard of compliance. Instead, it merely deline­
ated abstract "boundaries" of what constitutes Title IX 
compliance.141 
The imminent threat posed by this analytical void is that it will 
be too vague to effectuate any substantive changes in female pris­
ons.142 At best, "prison administration will . . . be subject to the 
power of federal courts, untrammeled by a usable legal standard," 
to ensure that it complies with Title IX.143 The void left by leldness 
was, however, unnecessary. The test promulgated by OCR in its 
Policy Interpretation to assess the provision of competitive oppor­
tunities in college athletics provides a forum for comparison of male 
and female prison educational programs. Adapting OCR's test to 
the prison environment will enable courts to fully effectuate the 
congressional intent with which Title IX was enacted, without com­
promising administrative concerns unique to prisons. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The fact that the majority explicitly used OSCI to demonstrate the mandates of 
Title IX is significant. It evinces the Ninth Circuit'S position that while the statute does 
not require that equality of opportunity be maintained between OWCC and every male 
iristitution within the state, Title IX, at a minimum, dictates that there be proportional­
ity between similarly situated male and female prisoners. This holding stands in sharp 
contrast to contemporaneous decisions rendered by courts addressing nearly identical 
claims under the Equal Protection Clause. See supra note 22. According to these 
courts, all differential treatment between men's and women's educational programming 
is the product of the initial decision to separate the genders and is thus lawful. See infra 
part IV.B.2 for an analysis of why compliance with Title IX should be assessed solely 
with respect to "similarly situated" men and women prisoners. 
138. See supra note 120. 
139. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
140. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1229. 
141. Id. 
142. See supra note 21 for an identical result arising within the context of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
143. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1235 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
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B. 	 Equality of Opportunity: A Standard of Compliance for Title 
IX Within the Prison Environment 
At the threshold of Title IX's enactment, one author poign­
antly foreshadowed that "it is unlikely that courts will hold uncon­
stitutional every difference in treatment" between male and female 
prisoners.l44 Accordingly, the author proposed that courts would 
"have to develop standards for distinguishing permissible penologi­
cal experimentation from illegal sex discrimination" if prisons con­
tinued to be separated by sex.145 Though it has been asserted that 
"[c]olleges are poor and inexact models for prisons,"l46 Title IX's 
application within the context of college athletic. programs provides 
a useful framework for distinguishing permissible differences from 
impermissible discrimination in correctional facilities. 
Similarities in both "substance and form" between athletic pro­
grams and prison educational programs make the former an appro­
priate model for the latter in assessing Title IX compliance. Both 
college athletics and prison educational programs are generally seg­
regated by sex. Moreover, both develop similar skills, namely lead­
ership and teamwork, and build self-confidence and discipline,147 
Thus, just as the lessons learned on college playing fields will con­
tribute to an athlete's success in life after graduation, so too will the 
lessons learned by prisoners in educational programs. In addition, 
both women athletes and women inmates are minorities within 
their respective spheres and thus often fall victim to institutional 
economies of scale.148 Conversely, their male counterparts receive 
144. 	 See Arditi, supra note 2, at 1251 n.119. 
145. Id. The author proposed that in making such a determination, courts evalu­
ate "whether a given differential carried with it a connotation of inferiority, whether it 
was systematic and pervasive, and whether the right at issue was so fundamental that 
the classifications affecting it deserve strict scrutiny." Id. 
146. Judith Resnik, Should Prisoners Be Classified by Sex?, CRIMINAL CORREC­
TIONS: IDEALS AND REALITIES 109, 116 (J. Doig ed. 1982). The author asserts that the 
rationale that single-sex universities foster women's growth does not apply to female 
prisons. "Placement in universities occurs by voluntary and mutual selection, rather 
than involuntary, unwilling designation." Id. 
147. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993) ("For college 
students, athletics offers an opportunity to exacuate [sic] leadership skills, learn team­
work, build self-confidence, and perfect self-discipline."); Justin Brooks, Addressing Re
cidivism: Legal Education in Correctional Settings, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 699, 718 (1992) 
("Education is the key to rehabilitation because it gives inmates the tools to deal with 
personal and societal issues that often lead to criminal behavior. "). 
148. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892 ("[A]t most schools, women are a relatively in­
conspicuous part of the storied athletic past. Historically, colleges limited athletics to 
the male sphere, leaving those few women's teams that sprouted to scrounge for re­
sources."); see also Arditi, supra note 2, at 1241-42, concluding that: 
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"the lion's share" of resources.149 Lastly, the student first, athlete 
second order of colleges parallels that of inmate first, student sec­
ond order in prisons. 
1. 	 Judicial Interpretation of TItle IX Compliance Within 
Intercollegiate Athletics 
In assessing TItle IX compliance within the context of athletic 
programs, courts have consistently held that colleges and universi­
ties may maintain separate teams for males and females, but must 
provide both genders with equal opportunities to participate in var­
sity sports.150 Judicial decisions have focused specifically on three 
benchmarks, which were propounded by OCR in its 1979 Policy In­
terpretation, to determine whether an institution satisfies this 
equality of opportunity standard.l51 These three benchmarks are 
collectively referred to by courts as the effective accommodation 
test.152 Under this test, courts examine: 
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities 
for male anc\t female students are provided in numbers substan­
tially proportionate to their prospective enrollments; or 
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are un­
derrepresented [ sic] among intercollegiate athletes, whether the 
institution can show a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing in­
terest and abilities of the members of that sex; or 
Differences in academic education generally stem from factors of scale and 
tend to disadvantage female inmates. In a few states, the one women's institu­
tion is considered too small to justify any educational program at all ... [or] a 
particular program will not be offered at the female institution but will be 
available at some of the state's male prisons. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
149. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893 (recognizing that men's athletics nationwide have 
traditionally "received the lion's share of dedicated resources"); Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 
F. Supp. 1162, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1980) (noting that the advantages afforded by the smaller 
size of women's state prisons are balanced by disadvantages such as "limited opportuni­
ties for recreation and education compared to those for men"). 
150. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828, 834 
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 
332, 343 (3d Cir. 1993); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896. 
151. The three benchmarks referred to were promulgated by OCR specifically to 
evaluate whether each sex in any given institution is being provided with competitive 
opportunities and schedules sufficient to reflect that sex's abilities. See Johnson, supra 
note 42, at 566. 
152. The three benchmarks were coined as the effective accommodation test in 
Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D. Colo. 1993), affd in part 
and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993). 
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(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented 
[sic] among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot 
show a continuing practice of program expansion such as that 
cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests 
and abilities of the members of the underrepresented [ sic] sex 
have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present 
program.153 
A university need only satisfy one of the three benchmarks to pass 
the effective accommodation test.154 
The first benchmark of the effective accommodation test, gen­
der parity, is assessed by comparing the percentages of male and 
female .undergraduates at the defendant university to the percent­
ages of male and female athletes.155 To pass this benchmark, a 
school must provide athletic opportunities in proportion to the gen­
der composition of the student body. Thus, an institution whose 
undergraduate student body is fifty percent male and fifty percent 
female must provide "a roughly equal number of [athletic] slots for 
men and women, as the student body is equally divided."156 Signifi­
cantly, it is the institution's choice to equalize up or down. That is, 
if there is disparity, a school may either provide more slots to the 
under-represented class or fewer to the over-represented class.157 
In evaluating the second benchmark of the effective accommo­
153. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979). 
154. See Johnson, supra note 42, at 566-67. It is important to note that "passing 
muster under the three-part test does not mean that the university is in compliance with 
Title IX: It may be violating the statute in some other respect. Conversely, failing this 
test is by itself enough to be in noncompliance with TItle IX." Id. at 567. 
It should be clarified that the Policy Interpretation was specifically formulated to . 
provide a framework for institutions to self-access compliance with Title IX. 44 Fed. 
Reg. 17,413. The three-part test therefore is couched in a manner that implies that an 
institution has the burden of proving compliance with one of three benchmarks. In fact, 
when female athletes bring suit under Title IX, they must prove, by a "fair preponder­
ance of credible evidence," that the institution fails to provide gender parity (bench­
mark one) and full and effective accommodation (benchmark three). If the plaintiffs 
are able to meet this burden they have established their prima facie case. The defend­
ant institution then has the opportunity of rebutting the plaintiffs' case "by adducing 
preponderant history-and-practice evidence." Cohen, 991 F.2d at 901-02. 
155. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897-98. 
156. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899. 
157. Id. at 898 n.15. OCR lists a number of justifiable exceptions to the gender 
parity requirement, including programs like football that require more resources be­
cause of the "unique aspect of the sport"; "special circumstances of a temporary na­
ture," such as the influx of first-year athletes requiring an infusion of resources; special 
"event management" expenses, provided these needs are met for Doth sexes; and af­
firmative actions to account for historical limitations on athletic opportunities for one 
sex. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-71,416. 
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dation test, history and continuing practice, one court has stated 
that an institution "cannot show program expansion for women 
solely by pointing to increases in the percentage of women athletes 
caused by reducing the number of men athletes."158 The same 
court held that a school must show either "actual expansion in wo­
men's athletic programming" or improvements in the status of wo­
men athletes at a time when the school had previously reduced its 
athletic program.159 The second prong is measured from the point 
in time that an institution has notice arising from an OCR review 
that it has failed to achieve gender parity.1OO 
With regard to the third benchmark of the three-part test, full 
and effective accommodation, courts have defined its boundaries in 
two significant respects. First, an institution need only provide a 
team if there are sufficient interested and able members of the 
under-represented sex to maintain one and a "reasonable expecta­
tion of intercollegiate competition for the prospective team. "161 
Second, compliance with the third benchmark mandates both full 
and effective accommodation, as opposed to proportionate accom­
modation. Thus, if 500 men and 250 women are able and interested 
athletes, the institution must provide 250 slots for women.162 An 
158. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D. Colo. 1993), 
affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 
F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 1515. In 1983, OCR found Colorado State University ("CSU") to be 
in violation of both the first and third benchmarks of Title IX's effective accommoda­
tion test following a Title IX compliance review. Nevertheless, an OCR official found . 
the university" 'to be presently fulfilling its obligations under 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) ... 
based upon [the university's] written assurance that the remedial actions set forth in 
[its] submitted plan [were] being implemented.'" Id. (quoting Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 at 3­
4) (citations omitted). In 1993, when female athletes challenged CSU's compliance with 
Title IX, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado determined that 
the relevant period from which to measure CSU's program expansion efforts was the 
day the college received notice that it did not satisfy either prong one or three of the 
effective accommodation test. Id. 
161. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898. 
162. Id. at 899. Under this approach, an institution must provide at least as many 
slots for men as it does for women. However, as long as women are the under-repre­
sented gender whose athletic interests are "fully accommodated," an institution can add 
or subtract as many slots for men as it deems appropriate. Id. at 899 n.16. 
Male athletes have challenged the validity of this approach on grounds that it 
transforms "'a statute which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex into a statute 
that mandates discrimination against males.'" Kelley V. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 
270 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Appellees' Brief at 9), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995) 
(citation omitted). The court in Cohen rejected this type of claim on three grounds. 
First, such an argument presumes that men are more likely to participate in sports than 
are women. Evidence, however, suggests that when provided with the opportunity, the 
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institution cannot satisfy the test by providing athletic slots to men 
and women in proportion to the ratio of interested men and wo­
men, that is, two to one, or 100 slots for men and 50 for women.163 
In determining whether female athletes have been fully and effec­
tively accommodated, courts have looked to the previous success of 
a sport that was subsequently terminated, current popular club pro­
grams, and a sport's popularity, both nationwide and in the relevant 
high school level applicant pool.164 
In light of the broad policy goals of Title IX, the clarity with 
which courts have assessed compliance with the statute in college 
athletics, and the overall similarities between intercollegiate athletic 
programs and prison educational programs, courts should use the 
OCR's effective accommodation test as a guide in quantifying the 
amount of "equality" to which female inmates are entitled. 
2. 	 A Proposed Framework of Title IX Compliance Within 
the Context of Correctional Facilities 
Because Oregon, like most states, has only one female prison 
but several male facilities,165 the initial difficulty with extending the 
effective accommodation test to correctional facilities is determin­
ing whether one or all male prisons should be used in assessing Title 
IX compliance at the female prison. The answer to this question is 
found by analogizing to case law that addresses a similar analytical 
problem in the sphere of equal protection in public education. 
Courts have declined to hold that the Equal Protection Clause re­
quires traditionally single-sex institutions to admit members of the 
excluded gender when one or more facilities essentially equal in 
prestige and course selection to those at the prospective school are 
available within the state.166 Thus, courts consider only comparable 
number of female athletes will equal the number of male athletes. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 
900. -Second, Title IX will "protect" men in those situations where men's athletic pro­
grams are underdeveloped, underfunded, or both. Id. at 900 n.17. Third. even assum­
ing Title IX "favors" women, Congress has broad Fifth Amendment powers to remedy 
past discrimination. Id. at 901. 
163. Id. 
164. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D. Colo. 1993), 
affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 
F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 580 (1993). 
165. leldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994). 
166. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 882 (3d Cir. 
1976) (denying female plaintiff the opportunity to attend classes at all male public high 
school because all female high school with courses of "similar and ... equal quality" to 
those at the male school existed), affd by an equally divided Ct., 430 U.S. 703 (1977); 
Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D.S.C. 1970) (rejecting male plaintiffs' 
365 1996] TITLE IX AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 
institutions in making this determination, as opposed to conducting 
a comprehensive comparison of all schools within the state.167 
Adapting this framework to the prison environment suggests that 
the men's prison most similar in security, size, and course selection 
to the women's prison should be used for Title IX comparison pur­
poses. Because of the large discrepancies in size among male pris­
ons within a single state, applying these objective factors will 
discourage manipulation by prison officials in choosing the appro­
priate men's prison with which to gauge gender parity.168 Accord­
ingly, because OSCI is the least populated of medium security 
prisons in Oregon,169 and, therefore most like OWCC, it will be the 
prison used for illustrative purposes. 
a. Gender parity 
The first question a court should ask in determining whether a 
prison provides equal opportunities to participate in educational 
programs is whether participation opportunities for male and fe­
male inmates are provided in numbers substantially proportionate 
to their respective representations in their particular prisons. In tai­
loring the effective accommodation test to meet the needs of the 
prison environment, the first benchmark may be assessed in two 
ways. Similar to the assessment made in athletic programs,170 
courts should determine the number of on-site educational "slots" 
or openings available to male and female inmates. Since OSCI 
houses 1100 male inmates,l71 and OWCC houses 213 female in­
mates,172 the ratio is five to one. Thus, the number of on-site edu­
cational slots available at OSCI and OWCC must roughly mirror 
the five to one ratio. In order to make this assessment, a court must 
requests to attend an all girls state college since the Citadel, a comparable all boys 
school, was accessible to them), affd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971); Kirstein v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970) (approving plan to allow 
female plaintiffs to attend the traditionally all male University of Virginia since compa­
rable state school was not available to plaintiffs). 
167. See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 882; Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 138; Kirstein, 309 
F. Supp. at 186. 
168. For example, if a state were allowed to subjectively choose which men's 
prison to compare to the women's prison, the state would tend to pick its largest men's 
prison. This is so because the sheer discrepancy in size between the largest male prison 
and the female prison would lend itself more easily to gender parity, the first bench­
mark of the effective accommodation test. 
169. ieldness, 30 F.3d at 1222. 
170. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993). 
171. ieldness, 30 F.3d at 1233. 
172. Id. 
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determine the total number of slots in the two classes offered at 
OWCC and compare that figure to the total number of slots in the 
thirty-four classes offered at OSCI. If, for example, the average 
number of inmates per class in Oregon's correctional facilities is 
twenty, the state would have to add approximately ninety-six edu­
cational slots to its curriculum at OWCC or subtract approximately 
four-hundred eighty slots from OSCI's educational programming. 
The chart provided by the dissent in leldness173 would suggest 
that Oregon presently satisfies "gender parity," since there are as 
many, if not more, slots provided to females as there are female 
inmates.174 Nevertheless, fairness and reason require that in assess­
ing the number of slots available to women, those "female slots" 
provided at OSCI be excluded. Specifically, the dissent stated that 
female inmates at OWCC participate in eighteen courses, yet it 
failed to note that sixteen of the eighteen are taught at OSCJ.175 
Accordingly, participants in those courses are subjected to skin 
searches and late arrivals as a result of having to be transported to 
OSCV76 
The rationale for excluding the courses taught at OSCI in de­
termining compliance with TItle IX is found in TItle IX's imple­
menting regulations and in the majority's opinion in leldness. 
Section 106.41 of Title IX's implementing regulations177 creates an 
exception to the rule of equality of opportunity to participate. Es­
sentially, the provision requires that where a women's team in a 
particular sport does not exist, females must be allowed to try-out 
for the men's team unless it is a contact sport.178 Presumably, be­
cause men are generally physically stronger than women, preclud­
ing women from competing with men in contact sports eliminates 
the potential for frequent and severe injuries to females and pre­
173. See supra note 115 and accompanying text for the dissent's chart. 
174. Again assuming for illustrative purposes that there is an average of twenty 
inmates per class in Oregon's correctional facilities, the dissent would argue that since 
the number of courses available to inmates at OWCC (18) multiplied by 20 equals 360, 
and the number of courses at OSCI (34) multiplied by 20 equals 680, the five to one 
ratio requirement is not only satisfied, but exceeded. leldness, 30 F.3d at 1232-33. 
175. This is deduced from the fact that only two courses, office administration and 
cosmetology, are offered at OWCC. Id. at 1224. 
176. Id. at 1223 & n.l. 
177. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1995). See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text for 
an overview of TItle IX's implementing regulations. Additionally, see supra note 33 for 
the language of § 106.4l. 
178. For purposes of § 106.41, "contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, 
ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which 
involves bodily contact." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). 
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serves the competitiveness of the game. The regulations, neverthe­
less, imply that, where women are allowed to participate with men, 
they must do so without restriction. It would be an anomaly to read 
TItle IX's implementing regulations to say that, where women par­
ticipate with men, their participation "slots" are counted, yet they 
must wear extra protective gear. While this condition likely would 
decrease women's chances of being injured, it also would hinder 
women's ability to compete to their fullest potential. Imposing such 
restrictions would contradict the essence of equality of opportunity 
to participate. A similar anomaly would result if those female in­
mates participating in programs at OSCI, and therefore subjected 
to skin searches and late arrivals, were factored into the gender 
parity analysis. Accordingly, gender parity in female prisons must 
be calculated solely on the basis of those on-site programs offered 
at OWCC. 
In addition to evaluating equality of opportunity in terms of 
participation slots, the same analysis should be made for course 
availability. In accordance with this approach, Oregon would have 
to add four to five courses to its educational program at OWCC or 
subtract roughly twenty-four courses from OSCI's program to meet 
the gender parity benchmark.179 Assessing gender parity in terms 
of course availability would prevent prisons from satisfying the first 
benchmark of the effective accommodation test merely by adding 
more participation slots to preexisting educational programs. To 
date, no university has been able to satisfy gender parity by simply 
recruiting more female athletes to its current teams or by creating 
two varsity teams of the same sport. Thus, since Title IX is aimed at 
equal opportunity in terms of both participation and variety, calcu­
lating gender parity in the prison environment based on both partic­
ipation slots and course availability will ensure full compliance with 
the statute. 
Critics of assessing equality of opportunity in terms of gender 
parity may argue that the tendency of all prisons will be to down­
grade the men's programs, thus denying female prisoners any tangi­
ble improvements in their educational programs.180 Though this is 
179. This analysis is based upon the premise that the average class size in Ore­
gon's correctional facilities is twenty. This number is used for illustrative purposes only 
and does not reflect the actual size of educational classes offered within Oregon's prison 
system. 
180. See Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1012-13 (N.D. Ga. 1968) ("Humane 
efforts to rehabilitate should not be discouraged by holding that every prisoner must be 
treated exactly alike .... To order the maximum for each and every person confined ... 
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an option available to prisons,181 whether it will be exercised is 
questionable, given that male prisoners are likely to become more 
volatile if denied a substantial number of programs previously 
available to them.182 
A second criticism of assessing Title IX in terms of gender par­
ity is that women inmates actually may be disadvantaged by its ap­
plication. Prior to plaintiffs' claims in Jeldness, women inmates 
were allowed to take sixteen classes at OSCI. Under the proposed 
analysis, though OWCC would be required to add four to five 
courses to its curriculum, Oregon would be able to terminate wo­
men's participation at OSCI without violating TItle IX. Accord­
ingly, female inmates may ultimately lose the opportunity to attend 
ten or eleven courses. This criticism, however, overlooks the fact 
that female inmates will be able to participate in a wider variety of 
classes at OWCC and, therefore, will not be subjected to skin 
searches and late arrivals as they had been at OSCI.l83 
b. History and continuing practice of program expansion 
Even if female prisoners in a Title IX action were able to show 
that gender parity does not exist between their facility and a com­
parable male prison within the state, prison administrators would 
still be able to defeat their claims by showing a history and continu­
ing practice of program expansion in the women's prison. In con­
trast to the first benchmark, which can be achieved by equalizing up 
or down, solely eliminating programs from the men's prison, or 
"equalizing down," will not satisfy this second benchmark.184 Thus, 
a prison must show either, (1) "actual expansion" in women's 
prison educational programming, or (2) improvements in the pro­
gramming at the women's prison at the time when the state's de­
partment of corrections had generally reduced its educational 
programming in one or more of the state prisons.185 
There are two disadvantages inherent in this second bench­
mark. The first is that compliance with this benchmark may be 
measured from the point in time that a prison is put on notice by a 
third party, such as an OCR official, that it fails to achieve either 
could result in a reduction of rehabilitative efforts rather than an implementation."), 
affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 266 (1969). 
181. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
182. See generally Brooks, supra note 147, at 709, 718. 
183. Ieldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1223 & n.l (9th Cir. 1994). 
184. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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gender parity or full and effective accommodation.186 The practical 
result of requiring notice to be given before a violation of Title IX is 
found is a potentially prolonged delay between implementation of 
an effective accommodation test and actionable claims. The sec­
ond, but related, disadvantage is that even if prison administrators 
cannot show a history and continuing practice of program expan­
sion, a written intention to do so will seemingly suffice,187 thus fur­
ther delaying realization of substantive changes in educational 
curricula at female prisons. Courts may lessen the impact of these 
delays by: (1) dispensing with the requirement of third party notice 
of noncompliance, simply deeming enactment of the test as suffi­
cient warning; and (2) requiring more than mere "written assur­
ances" that a facility intends to comply with the second benchmark. 
c. Full and effective accommodation 
The final way in which prisons can demonstrate compliance 
with Title IX is to show that the interests and abilities of female 
prisoners have been fully and effectively accommodated by the 
present programs. Assuming OWCC had fifty female prisoners in­
terested in participating in educational programs, compliance with 
this benchmark would require OWCC to provide fifty educational 
slots. OWCC, however, would not be mandated to provide fifty 
different programs if each of the prisoners were interested in differ­
ent courses. Rather, the prison need only provide a program if 
there are sufficient interested and able prisoners to support it.188 
What constitutes a "sufficient" number would depend largely on 
factors such as the average size of a particular program or whether 
the program required a great deal of individual attention between 
instructor and prisoner, thus justifying a small class. 
This third benchmark highlights an important distinction be­
tween Title IX athletic claims and prison claims. Generally, female 
athletes who bring Title IX claims are seeking to reestablish a wo­
men's varsity sport.189 In contrast, female prisoners often are re­
questing courts to· provide first time programs at the women's 
prison. Therefore, as in the athletic sphere, "it remains an open 
question whether the courts will be convinced of sufficient interest 
and ability in situations in which women sue" their prisons for fail­
186. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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ing to create educational programs or to provide equity of 
opportunity.l90 
The dissent's query in leldness as to why more importance 
should be assigned to prisoners' desires in implementing programs, 
rather than to "administrative determinations of what vocational 
training for prisoners would benefit society when they get out,"191 
has particular relevance under this benchmark. Though the frame­
work used to assess compliance with Title IX in correctional facili­
ties is the same standard used in the context of college athletics, 
prisoners arguably should not be afforded the same luxury of choice 
as college athletes. Expanding upon the dissent's reasoning, it 
seems evident that, had prisoners been able to make the right 
choices or to pursue "desires" deemed appropriate by society, they 
would not be incarcerated today. 
Although the dissent makes a forceful policy argument, a pow­
erful countervailing argument lies in the fact "that "[t]he more edu­
cation inmates receive, the more likely it is that they will not 
commit further crimes."l92 Experience dictates that if inmates are 
provided with programs that interest them they are more likely to 
participate in such programs. Conversely, programs mechanically 
chosen by prison administrators, "whose concerns lie in security 
and not in education,"193 will not be widely received by the inmate 
population and may lead to boredom, feelings of alienation, and 
increased violence. In light of the fact that many of these prisoners 
will someday reenter society, bringing with them these feelings of 
frustration, the ultimate benefit of ignoring prisoner's "desires" for 
the good of society is questionable. 
In light of the difficulty courts have had in determining the de­
gree of equality female prisoners should be afforded, they should 
rely on an adapted version of Title IX's effective accommodation 
test to assess compliance within the context of correctional facili­
ties. Application of the three benchmarks will allow courts to con­
tinue to defer to prison administrators by placing compliance with 
Title IX in their control. Specifically, the test provides administra­
tors with three opportunities to satisfy the statute, thus allowing 
ample flexibility to structure programs, without compromising ad­
190. See Johnson, supra note 42, at 582-83. 
191. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1233 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting). 
192. See Brooks, supra note 147, at 709. 
193. Id. at 718. 
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ministrative concerns unique to prisons,194 Similarly, it avoids the 
judicial micromanagement of prisons feared by the dissent in fe/d­
ness195 by enabling prisons to self-assess compliance with Title IX. 
Lastly, the test enables prisons to implement the requirements of 
Title IX objectively and uniformly, thus establishing a consistency 
in the "quality and structure" of educational programs currently 
lacking in today's prison system.196 
CONCLUSION 
Society, courts, and inmates in general have accepted the fact 
that prisons are and will continue to remain sexually segregated in­
stitutions,197 Without challenging this segregation, female prison­
ers, as the minority group of the prison population, have 
consistently argued for "separate but equal" treatment under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their dili­
gent efforts, however, have produced unsatisfactory results. Courts 
have either summarily dismissed these claims on grounds that the 
prerequisite sex discrimination is lacking or that male and female 
inmates are not similarly situated. At best, courts have ordered 
remedies too vague to ameliorate the disparities between male and 
female prison conditions. 
Perhaps in hope of realizing the success that female athletes 
have achieved using Title IX to create a more level playing field, 
women prisoners increasingly have cited to Title IX in their prayers 
for relief from sex discrimination arising from disparate educational 
opportunities available to male and female inmates. Title IX seem­
ingly affords more protection to women prisoners from disparate 
treatment than the Equal Protection Clause by more clearly defin­
ing the line between permissible and impermissible sex discrimina­
tion. In contrast to the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX implores 
prison administrators and courts to compare interprison programs. 
As between similarly situated male and female inmates, the statute 
requires, at a minimum, that a balance be maintained between the 
quality and quantity of programming offered to these prisoners. 
Specifically, compliance with Title IX requires that there be "rea­
194. See supra note 22. 
195. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1235. 
196. See Brooks, supra note 147, at 715 (The lack of consistency in prison educa­
tional programs in terms of "participation, quality, or quantity ... stems primarily from 
the absence of an umbrella authority regulating correctional education."). 
197. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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sonable opportunities for similar studies at the women's prison"198 
and that women have "an equal opportunity to participate in educa­
tional programs"199 as compared to their male counterparts. 
The standard for Title IX as articulated by the Ninth Circuit in 
leldness, however, falls far short of achieving women prisoners' 
prayers for separate but equal treatment. Notably, this standard 
nearly echoes the language employed by the court in Glover v. 
lohnson,2°O a case factually identical to leldness. In finding for the 
female prisoners on strictly equal protection grounds, the court in 
Glover held that "women [inmates] are entitled to a greater variety 
of programming substantially equivalent to that offered the 
men."201 Despite this favorable order, nearly eighteen years later 
the plaintiffs in Glover are still struggling to achieve the objectives 
of equal protection. Accordingly, unless the effective accommoda­
tion test used to assess Title IX compliance in intercollegiate athlet­
ics is adapted to the prison environment, even favorable court­
ordered remedies under Title IX will be too vague to effectuate any 
substantive changes in women's conditions of confinement. More­
over, the failure to develop a framework with which to apply Title 
IX will result in inconsistent and arbitrary remedies and create a 
need for continued judicial supervision of prison administration. 
Ironically, however, even if the effective accommodation test is ap­
plied within the confines of correctional facilities, the only hope fe­
male prisoners have of attaining true equality is if women commit 
more crimes and become a significantly larger percentage of the 
prison population.202 Until then, female offenders must settle for 
proportionate equality in educational programming. 
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